district for the spring campaign in 1989. A second team which completed the survey in Kolangar in early summer 1988 has already completed the autumn campaign in late November 1988. After the pilot phase in Jaghori district of Ghazni Province early this year, the first project started work this autumn.

A total of 17 staff, including the local assistants, are currently working in these three Provinces.

The total amount of time field officers spend inside Afghanistan is seven to eight months, i.e. two months in spring, two months in summer and three months in autumn. In the remaining four to five months they are busy in Peshawar with their project preparation, reports, budgets and proposals, short-term training courses, etc.

FIELD TRIPS

1. LOGAR (NASSIM JAWAD)

> "When the Soviets invaded Afghanistan I said they will leave Afghanistan sooner or later but before they do a hand-high (approximately 15cm.) metal (ammunition) will have fallen on the fields. And as you can see for yourself, the same has happened..."
>
> (Said Pazeer, 70 years old, farmer teacher, Charkh, October 1988)

General Information

Logar Province is located south of Kabul along the Kabul-Gardez highway with a pre-war population of approximately 300,000, a total area of 4,200 sq.km., of which approximately 20% is arable land. Its present capital Pul-i-Alam is approximately 15km. from Kabul. The Province is surrounded by Kabul, Ghazni, Wardak and Paktia Provinces.

Logar's main economic income is from agriculture, horticulture, animal husbandry and trade. Its agricultural and horticultural products used to be brought to Kabul and Pakistan, among which fruits, i.e. grapes and apples, and vegetables were the major cash crops of the Province. The Province in general was very fertile and was named as one of the gardens of Afghanistan. Animal husbandry provided additional income and supplementary food for the farmers.

Since it is close to Kabul it was one of the very important trade and market centres in the southern part. It had three main market centres (bazaars) in Charkh, Kolangar and Mohammad Agha. While Charkh bazaar was far from the main road and from access to troops and has remained basically unharmed, the two others in Kolangar and Mohammad Agha, which lie along the main road, have

been totally destroyed and huge ruins have been left behind. Each bazaar consisted of 200-300 shops and offered services in various skills. While Charkh presently offers goods to the population in the southern part of the Province, the closest market for the people in the northern part is mainly Kabul.

Beside the main Kabul-Gardez road there are a number of access roads between the different districts of the Province, of which much has been destroyed during the war and will need to be repaired, including bridges, etc.

Because of its proximity to Kabul access to education in the Province itself and in Kabul has been very good and Logar is one of those few Provinces which has a high number and level of education. Primary and middle schools existed in almost all districts before the war and there were two high schools in Mohammad Agha, one for boys and one for girls, with a total of approximately 2000 students in 1978.

Present Situation

Transport and access

Up to early 1988 it took at least a week to travel to Logar from any border point in Pakistan. After the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from the Province and the loss of the Kabul regime's control over the Province, there are now two main ways through which one can reach any part of Logar in two days. The easiest way is to rent a vehicle from Wana in Waziristan and drive through parts of Paktia to Ghazni and over the Kabul-Kandahar highway to Wardak, reaching Logar after a drive of two days and one night.

We took the second route, starting from Parachinar to the border post at Teri Mangal from where a four-wheel drive pick-up took about six hours to drive to Dubandi through Jaji and the recently liberated Soviet stronghold in Paktia, Chamkani. Due to lack of access on one side to roads and the fear of the Mujahedin to repair the rest of the road because the Soviet or Government troops may want to decide to come back, we had to walk for about eight hours to reach our first destination. But unfortunately we lost our way and it was dark at night so it took us about 14 hours to reach the first village in Baraki Barak, Qala-i-Jaber, a village which is now totally abandoned and except for a few refugee families from other parts of Logar noone is living there any more. At last after two hours' drive we reached Charkh, the southern District of Logar and where ARC had started its agricultural activities in 1986.

From Charkh we travelled to Kharwar, the last southern village, and then to Baraki Barak and Baraki Rajan, Kolangar, Mohammad

Agha and finally to Zarghoon Shahr by road, partly via Kabul-Gardez road but mainly by sand and dirt roads for the next two weeks. From Zarghoon Shahr to Dubandi again nine hours' walk and then with a pick-up to Parachinar in six hours.

The Kabul-Gardez highway compared to the Kabul-Kandahar highway is in pretty good shape, only a few places had severe damage whereas the rest of the road does not need much repair. Especially from Kolangar to Kabul the road has been properly maintained and signs of new work and repairs from the last two years could be seen clearly. The sand roads have lost their sand during the past ten years and the dirt roads have become more difficult to get through; not only have they not been maintained but also they have been heavily damaged by tanks and other heavy military transport. Many bridges leading to the villages have been destroyed by the Mujahedin to avoid access to troops entering the villages.

Transport facilities are available in all parts of the Province between the districts and between the Province and Kabul. Buses are going daily from Charkh, Kolangar, Mohammad Agha, Zarghoon Shahr and Pul-i-Alam to Kabul and back. A number of trucks are moving between Kabul, Logar, Paktia, Ghazni and Wardak frequently. The approximately 150km-long Kabul-Gardez highway is controlled 5 kms. from Kabul and 5km. from Gardez by the Government whereas the rest is controlled by the Mujahedin. No Government transport is passing on this road and all their supplies are presently going via air to Paktia.

We saw dozens of new four-wheel drive pick-ups owned by Mujahedin groups running thoughout the Province, almost all of them purchased in Pakistan and many with a temporary registration or no registration at all.

Population and Housing

Assadullah, a 12 year old boy from Kabul whose family decided to leave Kabul and move to Kharwar to their relatives, was asked by one of the Mujahedin accompanying us why his family decided to leave Kabul. He answered: "...for the past ten years it was you who got the bombs and missiles; now it is our turn in Kabul..."

While before the war approximately 80% of the population were farmers and the rest were traders, civil and army servants, presently almost everyone of those who remained in the Province have become farmers. As the majority of the younger generation is still busy with the war the agriculture and animal husbandry have been left to old men, women and children. Even those young Mujahedin who are no more active in the war and are presently living in their villages have no idea about work and agriculture. Most of them started to fight when they were 14-15 years old and all they know after the ten years of war is how to carry, handle

and clean their Kalashnikovs. This was in fact one of the major complaints of the older generation: What will be the future of all those young people, especially those under 25 years? Except in Charkh where the bazaar is still intact and skilled people are busy with their work, all others have become refugees in Pakistan or inside Afghanistan. Even those who have remained in Charkh are unable to provide their services to the community due to lack of tools, equipment, power and machines. Only minor works are done there whereas major repairs and works are sent to Kabul.
The second operating bazaar of the Province in Baraki is mainly providing basic daily needs and limited services to many groups of Mujahedin who pass the area. This area is one of the important access routes for Mujahedin from other Provinces including the northern and central Provinces.

There is still dense population in the southern parts of the Province; the further one goes to the north and towards Kabul the more people have left their villages and become refugees in Pakistan and/or Kabul. For example in Charkh, Kharwar and parts of Baraki which have been far from the roads and access to the troops and bombardments, only a few families have left and the rest have remained there in the past ten years. After each bombardment houses have been rebuilt and repaired, and although it is decreased the agriculture has been maintained insofar as the population has been able to survive. But in Mohammad Agha where before the war 400 families were living, only a few have remained. The same goes for half of Kolangar, Pul-i-Alam, Surkhab, Dubandi and parts of Zarghoon Shahr.

The same goes for housing. All houses except those which belonged to the activists and members of the PDPA in Mohammad Agha, half of Kolangar and Baraki, parts of Zarghoon Shahr and Surkhab, and all of Dubandi have been bombed and burned down by the troops. Travelling along the roads one can observe heaps of mud all over which can hardly be recognized as once being villages or bazaars.

<u>In conclusion</u> it is estimated that about half the Logar population have become refugees either in Pakistan or in Afghanistan, mainly in Kabul. We met a number of families who had just come from Kabul, even Kabulis in one case due to the pressure Mujahedin had put on Kabul by missile attacks etc. who have been busy preparing the fields for the next cultivation, mostly people who could afford to buy some seed and had enough reserves to survive for the next half a year. Education and health facilities are almost non-existent except for a few para-medics who are supported by voluntary agencies in Peshawar and a few village schools up to third grade in some villages, also supported by volags in Peshawar and by the political parties.

Agriculture

The economic situation of the districts differs depending how the agriculture has been affected. As mentioned before, where more population have remained in the villages, so also more land has been cultivated and maintained. In those villages the size of cultivated land has decreased not only due to bombardment and destruction during the war but also because of natural disasters such as lack of water, floods etc. and lack of man-power and traction. Thousands of jeribs of land have been abandoned due to these factors. The land which has been cultivated has produced only half of the yield compared to 1978 due to lack of selected seeds, fertilizer, technical assistance and attention by the farmers. Many other thousands of jeribs have been abandoned where people have left their villages. In some areas such as Mohammad Agha entire villages have been abandoned, their houses have been destroyed and the agricultural fields are overgrown with thorns and other wild plants and weeds. In many cases it will take the farmers at least two to three seasons to clear the land of weeds to be ready for proper cultivation.

Most of the fields along the highway especially have been heavily mined and it will probably take years to clear those mines.
Forests and orchards have always been a good place for the Mujahedin to hide themselves, therefore wherever troops had access trees have been cut down and orchards decimated to destroy the hiding places of the Mujahedin. This has of course been done arbitrarily regardless of whether Mujahedin existed in a specific area or not, it was just a general policy, especially along the highways and access roads to prevent the convoys being attacked by Mujahedin.

Where orchards are still standing the yield has decreased to at least 50% due to lack of water, man-power, treatment, technical assistance and so on. Many orchards have become wild, with trees overgrown, diseases of all kind are very common and so the quality of the fruit has reduced substantially.

There are only a few people in every village who can afford to buy selected seed every few years and a few bags of fertilizer. The rest of the farmers still use the same seed they had received 8-10 years ago. A bag of fertilizer, for example, which is sold by the Government at the rate of approximately 450.- Afs. is sold in the black market for a much higher price of up to 1400.- Afs.. Those who have elder people to send to Kabul or the provincial capital to get seed and fertilizer at the official rates have to pay a lot of money and go through a lot of hazards with the government officials, permits need to be taken from all levels of the authorities starting from Woluswali (district head-quarter) up to the Ministry of Agriculture. Sometimes seed and fertilizer arrive in the villages when the cultivation time is already over.

The number of animals has decreased to at least 50% of the pre-war figures. Those who have become refugees have taken their animals with them to Pakistan or sold them in Kabul, those remaining have slaughtered many to have additional food or to sell in order to buy other basic needs and, in the first years, to buy ammunition. The animals remaining in the villages face various diseases every year. Veterinary services are non-existent.

The main irrigation systems and channels in the Logar Province have been karezes and rivers. Karezes usually need to be cleaned every year and special care has to be taken to maintain the tunnel (canal) structures. In other words, repairs need to be carried out annually to maintain the average flow of water. In the past ten years neither cleaning nor maintenance work has been done on the Karezes so that some have collapsed totally and some of the wells are blocked totally and give no water at all. The amount of water from Karezes which have not been damaged or collapsed in many cases has decreased to a third compared to 1978.

The Karezes are usually community property and owned by a number of families according to their size and the amount of water they provide. Previously the community took care of the Karezes, hiring specialists to clean and maintain them regularly. These works have been ignored in the past years due to involvement of the manpower in the war, especially those used to do the work themselves and others who because of their critical financial situation could not afford it. Now after ten years there has been so much destroyed and damaged that it needs a substatial support from outside to bring the Karezes to their pre-war condition.

During the spring, rainy season and the snow-melt time the rivers bring heavy floods with them causing damage to the fields and orchards along the river side. Some sections (channels) of the rivers dry out during the summer and autumn period whereas in the rest a minimum amount of water still flows.

Before the war the villagers were making temporary dams and embankments to avoid their fields being flooded. On the other hand through the dams they could reserve some of the water for the later part of the year. Most of the work was done by the community except in a few serious cases where the Government came to help them by providing some additional manpower and traction. Although these constructions were basically very primitive, i.e. wooden beams and sand and dirt in bags, and they had to repeat the work every year, nevertheless it helped the situation for that same year at least. All these works have been neglected during the war again because of lack of manpower and assistance from outside. So a lot of the fields have been flooded during

those periods and there was no water reserved for the cultivation after the spring was over.

Mines

Mines are and will be the major problem in the next years to come. The Logar Desert, from which routes lead to all parts of the Province, is the most dangerous place. Travellers are always advised to follow the paths and never to step outside them. Those paths have been cleared by the Mujahedin in the past few months and can be used only during day time. Even cars and other transport facilities move mainly during the day because they say there is still possibility for the government troops in Pul-i-Alam to watch even further areas at night and they may still attack anything moving during the night. This is because there is not much opportunity for them to move outside their bases at day time.

Large areas of arable land specially along the roads and highways have been mined heavily not only by the Soviets but also by Mujahedin. Even if there is an agreement in the future and the Soviets agree to give maps of the mine fields, the Mujahedin will never be able to know where their mine areas are, especially in Logar, because those who have been active in attacking convoys and military bases have come not only from Logar but also from other Provinces and many of them are no longer in the area. Those from Logar who have been involved in planting mines are either dead or have gone to Pakistan and other places and noone else knows where the mine fields are.

Most of the agricultural land and orchards along the Kabul-Gardez road for example are mined. We met some people in Mohammad Agha who had come back from Kabul and had cleared their land and they were reporting large amounts of mines in the fields. Kaka Saiful Rahman an old man was telling us that after the woluswali (district head-quarter) was liberated in Mohammad Agha this spring, he started to work on his land and defused and/or exploded about 400 mines in 10 jeribs (4.8 acres) of land which took him about 45 days. One of the methods he used was for mines with wires spread over the field so that when you walk and catch the wire it is connected to a mine under the surface and explodes. He basically looked for the wires, connected them with a strong thread, went ten meters away and pulled the thread and the mine went off.

With such primitive but workable methods both Mujahedin and civilians are busy clearing the mine fields. Almost all access roads are cleared yet thousands of jeribs of land remain full of mines and it will take the Afghans decades to clear them unless international efforts are made to help them.

On the first day while we were walking on the Kabul-Gardez

highway the commander told us to stay on the metalled road and not to step on the sandy part of the road. We reacted very cynically and thought they are overdoing it a bit. An hour later we were sitting in a house close to the road when we heard a loud bang. A truck was moving towards Kabul and since it got late the driver decided to turn back and stay in the village and leave next morning. While he was trying to turn the truck back the front tyres went off the road and hit a mine. Three people sitting in the truck including the driver were heavily injured and were brought to Pakistan a week later.

Needs

a) Agriculture

- Selected seeds and fertilizer need to be reintroduced and carefully used. Misuse of fertilizer in huge amounts in other parts of the world have had devastating results. Seed farms should be established inside the country for a long-term solution instead of bringing in huge amounts of seed from outside. There is presently some selected seed available inside the country which could be improved and multiplied.

- Agricultural tools and equipment are needed, taking particular note of the lack of man-power traction. Special attention should be paid in this regard: due to lack of spare parts, technicians and knowledge of the farmers in maintaining mechanized equipment, it should be avoided to bring in machinery. Afghanistan once a self-sufficient country in food production has gone back at least 20-30 years in its economic sector especially in agriculture. Although many farms had tractors before, they cannot afford them any more, yet the country is ready for mechanisation at this stage. Ideas like machinery for "community" and "community property" are ideal but not applicable at the moment and under present circumstances. Therefore preferably provision of oxen to individuals, especialy to poor farmers, is the best solution. Tractors and other machinery can be only used in model and pilot projects.

- The traditional irrigation systems should be repaired and rebuilt at first as well as dams and embankments along the river sides, to prevent the existing land from flooding and help farmers to save some water for the later part of the year. In the spring when the floods come down from the mountains not only the rivers are filled but also many temporary rivers are created. By constructing dams and reservoirs in those places, additional thousands of jeribs of land could be irrigated and cultivated. These reservoirs will not only save some water but also keep the water level in the Karezes high during summer and autumn.

Use of water pumps specially in areas with Karezes should be avoided since these will pump out lots of water for a certain moment and a specific area but will dry out all Karezes in the area.

- Nurseries for fruit trees and forestry should be established now before it is too late, to ensure the continuation of horticulture which helps people to have some additional food and which is their main cash crop. Forests have been not only bombed and burned down during the war but also cut down in many places and the some of the wood brought to Pakistan and Kabul. I had seen Jaji the first time in 1981, when it was a place full of dense forest, then in 1984 when half of the forest had gone to Pakistan already, and now there is nothing more left except a few bushes here and there.

  One of the major problems we will all face in rebuilding houses and villages by the time refugees will go back home will be roof-beams. If no appropriate solution is thought out now this will cause a disaster for the country as soon as people start cutting the rest of the trees in the villages and mountains. Any seedlings going from Pakistan to Afghanistan will have no or little result there due to change of climate, soil, etc. We saw a few tree seedlings in Kandahar and Logar which were provided by some agencies in Peshawar: not more than a fifth had survived.

  It will not be correct to talk about severe malnutrition or danger of famine, yet malnutrition specially among women and children is a major health problem due to lack of quality food. Although there is enough food so that people can survive, they all lack vitamins and protein. Therefore reintroducing vegetables and animal husbandry is essential.

- In the first step veterinary services and then animal farms are needed. Poultry and bee-keeping used to be done in the Province and could be implemented today, starting from a central point as a model project to motivate the population for multiplication.

b) Health

Health services and facilities are needed in cooperation with the local people. Special attention should be paid to avoid the mistakes from the first years. For example, all those young people who have been trained in Peshawar have become doctors today and even undertake operations in the villages. Most of the work which many of these young people are doing is harming more than helping. No preventive health services exist. Women and children have no access to even these limited services.

c) Education

Education services are also needed, in cooperation with the local people. There is a keen interest on education in every part of the Province. Wherever we went people asked us about possibilities of supporting schools.

d) Construction

Access roads and bridges in villages as well as between the districts are essential for the implementation of the projects specially in the view of the anticipated large operations by aid agencies once the refugees start moving back to their home villages.

e) Initial Assistance

Thousands of families have lost their bread-winners and will not be able to survive without assistance from outside, considering the low income and the miserable economic situation of their communities. Any assistance to those families should aim at a long-term solution and hand-outs should be avoided if possible.

2. KANDAHAR (GUNNAR ANDERSEN)

Although there are a lot of similarities in the two Provinces of Logar and Kandahar, yet they are very different in their ethnic, linguistic, organisation and social structures, and also somehow in their political structures. (For detail please see Appendix 3.) People have different attitudes, too.

Entering Kandahar is done via Quetta and Pishin in Baluchistan, Pakistan. Control and checkposts are quite lax and there are no major problems entering Kandahar. Apart from the insecurity of moving in some mined areas, we faced no security problems on the trip. Our area of survey was Maroof District where the ARC team is working.

The whole of Maroof is liberated and in Kandahar there is only Kandahar City and airport which is still under the control of the Government/Russian troops. The Mudjaheddin have surrounded the City and airport, but according to information gathered from commanders and others participating at the front, they are only making minor attacks and are waiting for the Russian withdrawal. The Mudjaheddin claim they can take the City and airport in a few days, but are afraid of the consequences for the civil population during the attack and later terror bombing. Commanders we talked to said they will use the coming winter months to develop a stronger unity among the different Mudjaheddin groups. In Maroof the last Government Post was taken by the Mudjaheddin in May this year. Kandahar has 19 districts and only one city, Kandahar.

CONTENTS

Our starting place in Maroof is Anghizi which is 6-7 hours drive from Pishin through semi desert areas. Travelling is done at night and limits the possibility to get an impression of the area. Hardly any houses or other signs of human presence are seen. The area is hilly. The trip in Maroof is mostly done on foot, but it is possible to drive most of the route which we travelled with a four wheel drive or other strong vehicle. The trip to Anghizi as well as the round trip in Moroof tells about the need for road-construction.

Anghizi.

Most of Kandahar is a dry area so naturally a lot of our attention was focused on karezes and other possibilities to improve irrigation. In Maroof we find that villages are widespread and it could be a day's walk from one village to the next. Most villages are small with 5 to ten families in each. Anghizi belongs to Salizun District (Sub-District of Maroof) and the area has 35 villages.

Anghizi is situated on both sides of a branch of the Salizun river. The river is an important part of the irrigation and smaller streams are connected to the river branching out and irrigating the land. As in several other places in Maroof the land is utilized only every second year due to lack of fertilizer, proper irrigation and rotation of crops. Most villages we visited give a strong impression of underdevelopment, partly caused by the war.

12 karezes are to be cleaned with ARC assistance in the area. 8 are completed and 4 are still under work. These karezes are not all that long. The length of a karez can vary from several hundred meters to more than ten kilometers. The damage to these was less than expected so the cost was overestimated. The savings will go to other parts of the project in Maroof. The number of families benefitting from this karez cleaning varies from 15-50. Average family is 7 members. Each karez irrigates 2-3000 jeribs.

As in Logar it is striking to see the harmony in the village set-up. Harmony in the sense that the size of the village corresponds with the amount of land used and the traditional irrigation system.

In the first years of the war there was a large number of refugees in this area, but already 5 years ago people started to return back. The house we slept in was in ruins for 4 years, but rebuilt 2 years ago and the family living there has brought their agricultural production back to almost pre-war level. The family was supported with seed and fertilizer by the ARC project 2 years ago.

On our way back to Pakistan we spent more time in Anghizi, having a meeting with the local Shura. This seven member Shura was created by the ARC Field Officers and this was their fourth meeting. The meeting took place in a school which was under construction. Building of the school was initiated by the locals and supported by the ARC program. The school meant that children from different villages came together for the first time.

When asked to give a priority list of the most needed work to be done in the area the Shura gave the following:

1. Cleaning of karezes.
2. Construction of embankments to avoid destruction of agricultural land in spring and for irrigation purposes.
3. Primary schools.
4. Tools and equipment to do repairs and produce simple agricultural tools.
5. Road construction
6. Establish a basic health unit in the area.
7. Veterinary services.
8. Crop disease control and medicines.
9. Continuation of the help to martyred families.

When asked if the local society could do any of the above-mentioned, the answer is: "We can contribute with our labor and minor investments, but in general we are in such a difficult economical situation that we would need a lot of support."

Dam construction is mentioned for irrigation, but is regarded as more long-term development work since cleaning of karezes will provide enough water to allow the local agricultural production to feed the population, including returning refugees.

80% of the livestock has been killed during the war, including plowing oxen, and ARC is asked to supply the area in this field.

No technical training is or has been available in the district and a training center is mentioned as a possible and needed project. Asked if any could participate in training courses in Peshawar or other places the answer is: We do not have people in the area who have enough knowledge (reading and writing) to participate in those courses. Training in technical skills must also include learning reading and writing.

One member of the Shura is 2nd in command to one of the central commanders surrounding Kandahar. He expresses his concern for the lack of education and "civil" knowledge among the Mudjaheddin and they are this winter teaching reading and writing at the front. "We have faced a lot of problems on the fronts when we had to teach the Mudjaheddin how to use more sophisticated weapons and this has made us realize the need for education both for military and civilian purposes."

The commander told us there is unity among the commanders representing different parties. While surrounding Kandahar this winter they will work to strengthen this unity and create a Shura among the chief commanders. He also says that the link to the Peshawar based parties is weak. As in Logar people seems to have no relationship to these parties and they regard the Mudjaheddin commanders along with the traditional leaders as their present leaders.

Often we get the impression that religious education is the only educational concern of the Islamic resistance, but in Maroof as well as in Logar, elders and local leaders often expressed deep concern of the lack of basic general education among the young people.

Obatu.

Obatu is our next stop and is the place which the ARC Field Officers use as their base. Our journey takes us through a dry area where only a couple of small villages are to be seen. Some houses are in ruins, but otherwise there are little signs of war. There is no road and during our 2 hours drive the vehicle gets stuck 2 times in loose sand. Hard to believe that this dry and brown area is green in spring and early summer.

We have a meeting with the local Shura and the priorities for work to be done are much the same as in Anghizi. One point is often mentioned: The ARC Field Officers have established a Shura which works across the party and tribal lines and this is very much appreciated. As mentioned earlier, suspicion among people is a serious problem, and the locals often came back to the point about the project and the Shura being a strong uniting factor for the people.

Requests for support in fields not mentioned in the Angihzi Shura were:

1. More education and advice to local farmers. The topics mentioned are very basic. What grows best in the different soil, how to water different types of vegetables, how to use fertilizer, etc.

2. Help for rehabilitation of war-wounded and handicapped persons.

3. Tractor with a skilled driver employed.

4. The Project needs a center from where the different activities can be administered. Security is mentioned as a problem here, as in Logar. One suggestion is that a local

security force can be established having members representing all the different parties.

Need for medical assistance was mentioned again, but the approach was different. Some people have been trained in first aid in Pakistan to work at the fronts. Some of them are now calling themselves Doctors and are, as one man said, taking more lives than they are saving.

Other International Agencies are working or are planning to start work in Kandahar and the Shura expressed the need to have the activities coordinated and controlled by some local authority, preferably a Shura. One remark is: "We have had the Russians for ten years coming with tanks, a lot of damage can also be done from those who want to come with tractors." One example is mentioned:

One agency introduced a tractor for two villages. The tractor was to be rented by the hour at half the normal rate. Two brothers who already were running a business like this lost their market because the could not beat this subsidized price.

The Shura in Obatu was established 3 years ago and the Field Officers say it took three years to make it work properly.
The local systems are fragile. Different kinds of financial inputs must be carefully evaluated not to break the already existing local structures. A major input is expected from a lot of international agencies in the years to come and the need to have their programs approved by a local authority is obvious. In most rural areas there has been no such authority in the last ten years.

There are two karezes supplying Obatu. Both of them have been closed for four years during the war due to lack of maintenance. Cleaning started in March 1988 with ARC funding. They are still under work, but one of them started giving water 2 months ago.
The other karez is expected to give water in a couple of months. To complete the work will then have taken about one year. 20,000 animals (goats and sheep) now have this karez as their drinking place, coming with their shepherds from surrounding areas.

We inspect the work in the karez by being lowered with a rope 25 meters down through the 80 cm wide well. Presently the team of four are working about 30 m further up from the well. To work under these conditions several hours a day is very impressive. The small oil-lamps have hardly enough air to give light and the men are working barefoot with water up to their knees. Salary is Rs.40 to 50/- per day (approximately US3.00). The equipment used is very old fashioned. With spades a cowskin sack is filled with sand, mud and stones. Then dragged down to the well and pulled up with a wooden pulley.

The work could surely be done more efficiently and with less damage to health, and it would be worthwhile for a project to look closer into this. All over Afghanistan karezes need to be cleaned and the country has thousands of them. The tools and the working method are said to be mostly the same all over the country.

In the Obatu Valley we inspect a possible site for an irrigation dam. The land which could benefit from this is community land and a dam would make most of the uncultivated land fertile and productive the whole year. The dam project would be very labor intensive, but since refugees have started returning back to the area this should not represent too big a problem. About 1000 families from this part of Maroof are presently living in Pakistan as refugees. In Obatu itself 1/3 of the pre-war population are living as refugees. A project like this would create jobs in a repatriation phase and the community would benefit from it in the years to come.

Vegetable production has been initiated by the ARC Field Officers. Hardly any vegetables were grown in the area before this initiative. Very little were used and, if ever, bought from Kandahar or Pakistan. The local prices of onions are now down to normal as compared to the time when they were not locally produced.

So far 50 needy families have been supported by the ARC project in this area. Most of the families have received goats for the children to keep. As in Logar the main problem for these families is that the breadwinner and other adult male family members are killed in the war.

6 skilled people have been supported with basic tools and equipment. This part of the project will expand next year, both in Logar and Kandahar, in cooperation with the ARC Assistance to Skilled Afghan Refugees Project.

The rest of the trip in Maroof is done by foot and we spend time with groups of people in many different villages. Hours of discussion and it was very encouraging to see the interest people are showing. Obatu and Angihzi are the places were the main ARC inputs have been done so far. The living conditions are much the same in most of the places we later visited and naturally the same problems were faced by the locals. The remaining part of this report will not repeat that already mentioned above, but will indicate additional points from the different Villages visited. This does not mean to say that the places or the problems are of less importance, but we will come back to them in concrete project proposals if considered feasible. The main problems/tasks can be summarized as follows:

1. Increase of agricultural production, mainly by inputs on irrigation, seed, fertilizer and tools and equipment.

2. Education, general as well as technical and agricultural.

Khwajal Zai Village

This village used to house 22 families. 5 families are presently living there, the rest are refugees in Pakistan. They have heard about the ARC project and want to have a representative in the Obatu Shura. If/when more families return they will be entitled to have one representative.

A lot of arable land is surrounding the village, but it has not been utilized for the last 6 years. The land is heavily overgrown and a large vineyard is nothing but some dry sticks. No war activities for the past two years, but people have not started to return back.

Tarkhum Village

Tarkhum is the name of the central village, but 5 villages are situated close to each other. Pre-war population was 100 families in the 5 villages, today 45 of these families are living as refugees. Few families have returned.

Before the war there was a school in the central village. Children from 10 different villages attended. For the last ten years there has been no school. Local people suggest that they can be supplied with basic teaching equipment and they will themselves provide room for teaching and teacher. Asked why they had not continued to run the school they answer: We never knew when fighting or bombing would come back again, just recently we started believing that we again can live our lives in peace." This attitude was quite common to find both in Logar and Kandahar and expresses the need for moral support. All over we found people to be hard working and willing to contribute as long as they got "the first push".

ARC is supporting the cleaning of the karez to the central village by 2/3 of the total cost, 1/3 is paid by the local community. One portion of the karez has to be rebuilt completely due to destruction during the war.

Toghla Village.

Toghla is situated by the Maroof River and has a lot of irrigation possibilities. The journey between Tarkhum and Thogla takes us past several deserted and destroyed villages. The

meaninglessness of this war is striking. Small villages, where people lived a peaceful life without much connection to the outside world, are in ruins. No main roads, railways, bridges etc. are here, just overgrown land which used to give food to the 150 families living here. Thogla used to be 14 small villages. Most of them are ruins today and there are only 10 families living here. No families have returned yet. They became refugees in the first years of the war. Approximately 1500 jeribs of land are cultivated presently, but several times this amount are potential arable lands.

Spingei Village

In Spingei we see for the first time clear signs of recently returned refugees. Newly constructed houses and land being plowed for the first time in many years. 22 families have been supported with seed and fertilizer.

Spingei is a new area for the ARC Field Officers and no Shura has been established yet. The work in the area will continue in March 1989 and members of a Shura will be elected up to then. A few more families are expected to return back next spring.

Dulagey Village.

This village is also quite new for the ARC project and the Shura meeting we attend was the first. The meeting is mainly used to explain the means and targets for the project and how the Shura should work. The Shura is asked to prepare a priority list based on the principle:Help to self-reliance.

Maroof is a large District and the question of establishing a central Shura is raised. This should be considered after next year's programs when more Shuras are active in the District.

The area around Dulagey is fertile and situated along Maroof River. Here are good possibilities to increase the agricultural production, and the first major input will be done in spring '89.

The locals are expecting some families to return in spring '89. The link between those families living as refugees and those in the villages is close. Many have been back during the war and there are always people travelling between the refugee camps and the different Districts of Afghanistan.

Khogiany and Mohammad Zai Villages.

Along the Maroof River to Khogiany we again pass by deserted and ruined villages. Khogiany was the District headquarters and two

destroyed tanks in the hillside are some of the reminders of the battles fought here. Ruins and overgrown land tell another side of the story.

There is no established Shura, but some people have been supported with seeds and fertilizer and two karezes are being cleaned with support from ARC, one in Koghiany and one in the nearby village of Mohammad Zai. A third karez is beefing cleaned with local funds. Only the karez in Khogiany will irrigate 5000 jeribs of land. Tanks and other heavy machinery used to move there and it has fallen apart the last hundred meters before it surfaces. The people working with the karezes are requesting more equipment.

Time is spent with the local people preparing to establish the Shura. One argument is that the Commanders from the village should be involved in the Shura since they are the real power at present. It is agreed that they will have their representative.

For the first time on these trips we hear it clearly expressed that people are tired of the war. We would always have our doors open for the Mudjaheddin, one man says, these days some doors are closed, but, we will open them again for you when you come here to support us to get the country rebuilt.

Around Koghiany mines were planted. Nobody knows exactly where and an attempt to destroy them was stopped after the crew had an accident. The cleaning crew came from one of the Peshawar based parties.

In the area around Koghiany and Mohammad Zai we visited two possible dam projects. The area has a lot of agricultural potential and dams could irrigate thousands of jeribs. Both places surveyed have natural environment for building of dams. The rivers where large amounts of spring water is running for three months are in small steep valleys and give a good starting point for the construction work. 11 villages could benefit from these dams. Construction labor could be recruited from returning refugees, giving them salaries in the resettlement period.

Introduction of vegetable seeds has given very good results in Mohammad Zai Village.

Abu Quala Village.

From Mohammad Zai to Abu Quala we have to walk partly through a mined area. An old man is guiding us safely, telling stories about human beings and animals recently having been killed by the mines. The stories are plenty and there will be more to be told if nothing is done, not only here, but all over Afghanistan.

Around Abu Quala there used to be several government posts and the village is almost completely destroyed. The fighting has been heavy and presently there are only one Commander, a few of his men and some elders staying there. The number of families which used to stay there is not known, but judging from the size it is estimated to be somewhere between 150 and 200. When the government/Russian troops left in spring this year they had to be airlifted out. On their way they bombed this and other nearby villages, killing a large number of the civilian population and destroying houses, fruit-orchards and agricultural fields. An input is needed in all fields, but it has to be approached from Pakistan since all the people are living as refugees.

Turwam Villages

Turwam villages are our last stop before returning to Anghizi and Pakistan. The villages are situated closely together in a hilly area. The same problems exist as in most other places- irrigation, schools, health, roads etc. The number of refugee population is not clear but we see several destroyed and deserted houses.

The local Mullah who also is a commander has abandoned music in his village. In the evening in his house this is discussed and despite the Mullah's serious and " conservative" attitude the locals are joking with him on this subject. The Mullah is maintaining his point of view saying: "There has been enough music and shooting the last ten years." Like the discussion in Charwar (Logar) about water wells, this one also goes on about where this is written in the Koran and how to interpret the Holy Book.

These kind of discussions, both in a friendly and sometimes quite aggressive way, are very common, and we often listened to them on our trips in Logar and Kandahar. Mostly it showed a quite strong opposition from the people towards the strong fundamentalistic trends which have been dominating the policy of some of the Peshawar based parties.

Spending time with the Mullah/Commander gives an impression of a broad minded person who is concerned just as much about general education as about religious education. This is also the impression from meeting several hundred people at grassroots level during our trips. Often the impression from outside is that a lot of projects will be difficult to implement due to the strong fundamentalistic attitudes developed during the war. The strong religious element in the war and the impact it has had on the people should not be underestimated, but often it seems to have developed fear and suspicion among people more than strong fundamentalistic attitudes.

In Turwam the people have started to clean a karez on their own, but are facing problems to complete it. We are also taken to the site of a possible irrigation dam project. The site seems to be ideal for a dam and like other sites we have seen it could irrigate lots of land.

Irrigation with water dams is not very common in Afghanistan and the idea has come up from people studying this while being refugees in Pakistan and Iran.

To be mentioned again is that road repair and construction are needed all over Maroof District.

On our journey back to Angihzi we pass by several smaller villages, again seeing ruins and fields which have given no crops in the last ten years.

When passing by the villages with our group it is common to see children running away and starting to cry. On trips like this it is easy to focus all on the physical destruction. What has happened mentally and emotionally with the people is often forgotten and it will take a generation for these invisible wounds to heal.

One last point which must be mentioned is the Afghan hospitality. Wherever we came we were received as a member of the family. No matter what time of the day or lack of food we were always given something. If there was no food in one house people were sent out to collect from the neighbors. This is common all over the country as well as in the refugee camps. If you are enemy, foreigner or a local man, it is an honor to have the guest properly fed. Apart from being an incredibly strong and hardworking people, their amazing hospitality will be a major contribution to help 5 million refugees return to Afghanistan safely.

INTRODUCTION


After the signing of the Geneva Accords between Afghanistan, Pakistan, the Soviet Union and USA in April 1988, hopes arose for an early settlement of the Afghanistan issue, including the withdrawal of the approximate 120,000 Soviet troops and the formation of a broad-based Government in Kabul acceptable to the Afghan nation.

A special mission/task-force was set up by the Secretary General of the UN, "Office of the United Nations Coordinator for Afghanistan," headed by Prince Sadruddin Agha Khan, to look into possibilities for the resettlement and repatriation of approximately 5 million refugees in Iran and Pakistan and another 2-3 million displaced people within Afghanistan itself.

ARC was among the first Voluntary Agencies who came to Pakistan in early 1980 and started to work for the refugees as well as trying to implement some projects inside Afghanistan such as medical work and support of training of medical personnel. In 1988 ARC was running projects in the fields of health, sanitation, employment, technical training and income generating in refugee camps in Pakistan, and agricultural projects in three Provinces of Afghanistan, i.e. Kandahar, Logar and Ghazni, with a total staff of 220, out of whom about 90% are Afghan and the rest Pakistani and five expatriates; its total budget was approximately 35 million Pak. Rupees.

It is worth mentioning that ARC is currently being funded by a number of agencies in Europe such as Norwegian Refugee Council and Norwegian Church Aid in Norway, Stichting Vluchteling and NOVIB in Holland, Bread for the World in West Germany, OXFAM in UK, HEKS in Switzerland, International Institute for Cooperation (IIZ) in Austria and, finally, UNHCR, which is one of ARC's main donor agencies. Project and budget proposals are negotiated with UNHCR locally in Pakistan while other organisations come together once a year in Vienna and negotiate and discuss on an annual basis.


Due to the fact of possible changes in Afghanistan and possible expansion of ARC's activities there, ARC's main effort in ITS last Donor Conference, which took place in September 1988 in Vienna, was focused on two main issues. Firstly, it was decided that since the situation was not yet clear as to when and how the refugees might be able to return back to their homeland, the refugee assistance should continue as per 1988, and ARC should not go into expansion of its refugee programmes next year except in training activities, which seem to be vital for the future work in Afghanistan. Secondly, possibilities of expansion of its activities in Afghanistan should be investigated carefully in accordance with the result of the current projects and ARC's managerial and personnel capacities.




LOGAR PROVINCE

KANDAHAR PROVINCE

LOGAR


Peshawar
Kohat
Bannu
Miram Shah
Parachinar
NANGARHAR
Jalalabad
Mehthar Lam
Sarobi
KABUL
Deh Sabz
Bagrami
Pul-i-Alam
Mohammed Agha
Gardez
Zormat
PAKTIA
Khost
Jaji Maydan
Chamkani
Urgun
Sharan
Ghazni
Asadabad
Khas Kunar
Surkh Rud
Khogiani
Rodat
Shinvar
Dih Bala
Kama
Nazyan
Musakhel
Tani
Jadran


Qalat-i-Ghilzai
ZABUL
Arghandab
Jaldak
Tarnak
Arghastan
Kandahar
Shavaliko
Arghandab
Panjwai
Maiwand
Khakrez
Tarin Kot
Deh Rawd
Musa Qala
Nawzad
Girishk
Lashkar Gah
Nava-yi Barakzayi
KANDAHAR
Spinboldak
Quetta
Kushk-i-Rud
Maruf
Reg i stan

APPENDIX 2

THE SHURA

Shura, Jirga are words which mean council. They have been the main if not the only traditional socio-political structure in the rural areas of Afghanistan for centuries. The members are selected rather than elected from the elders, religious leaders and other powerful personalities and the councils function at different community levels, i.e. village-based, district-based, provincial-based and finally nationwide. The system is based on consensus and is considered to be more democratic than many other political structures. Majorities and minorities do not exist and issues have to be discussed as long as is needed until all parties are prepared to compromise and all sides have agreed on the decision. Once an agreement is reached, which is not written anywhere, it cannot be taken back or ignored or neglected unless another Shura or Jirga brings up a new decision. Escaping from a decision would mean escaping from that community. Even at the times where the central governments had their influence, they were not able to take any decision without the agreement of the local councils.

One important and historic decision took place at the national level after the second World War, when thousands of Germans from the Asian countries had fled to Afghanistan during the War because Afghanistan remained one of the few countries neutral in the War. As soon the War came to an end the Soviets from the north and the British (who at that time still kept India as a Colony) asked the central government in Afghanistan to deliver those Germans as prisoners of war. The government was unable to make any decision being under pressure of two superpowers on one side and having the tradition of hospitality on the other side. It called a national jirga to decide upon the Germans, most of whom had nothing to do with the War and were rather dealers, traders and others who had been working in several countries in the region. The national Jirga decided that the top priority of Afghan society is hospitality and even if someone wants to run away from his enemies, the most secure place for him is the house of his enemy and there the enemy has to be host and also protect him from his other enemies. Any harm to the guest will damage the host's reputation and honour. So the Jirga decided that the Germans would be sent back to their own country after the establishment of a post-war government in Germany, that regardless whether they were Nazis or not they were the guests of Afghanistan, and that they would be defended till the last moment against Soviet and British demands.

Although the system had been corrupted by the past government, especially in the 20th century, and has been misused for the purpose of political power, it still has a stronghold in the

rural areas and is the sole workable system in political and socio-economic questions in rural Afghanistan.

After the failure of the political parties to replace the traditional system during the war, the council system became a vital system not only for the Mujahedin but also for the civil population and has been the main forum for discussing and solving their military, political, economic and social questions.

APPENDIX 3

KANDAHAR : SHURA & COURT

The social, political and military system in Kandahar is based on two systems, the Shura and the Court. While economic and military issues are discussed in the Shura, the Court is responsible for the social and law and order issues including military law and order, e.g. treatment of prisoners of war.

The Court has three stages: Lower Court, High Court and Supreme Court. The Judges are qualified Mullahs with experience and do not belong to any political party or system and they must be independent. Although civil people as well as Mujahedin take part in the Court sessions, they are there only as observers.
All other questions are discussed and problems solved through the Shura. Shura members are not only Mujahedin commanders but also civilians, men who are respected and/or powerful, regardless of their party affiliation.

One evening we sat with a commander who was also called Mullah by the villagers (the term Mullah is used for anyone who has studied Islamic studies and knows enough about the religion) who tried to explain the Shura and Court system to us. We asked him what are the criteria to be powerfull and become a member of the Shura. He said that before the war there were three kinds of powerful people: 1) people with much land and money, 2) Mullahs and 3) people with knowledge and capability to do extraordinary things.

During the war this changed a lot, ordinary Mullahs and people with land and money lost their privileges, the former did not have enough knowledge to lead the Jehad (Holy War) and the latter became poor or left the country. Therefore the most powerful people remained those with knowledge and capability to do extraordanary things and they became commanders, judges and members of Shuras. Unlike Logar, in Kandahar the Courts and Shuras were already created at the beginning of the war and were always the stronghold of the Province and the symbol for unity.

APPENDIX 4

ROLE OF FOREIGN AGENCIES WORKING FOR AFGHANISTAN

NASSIM JAWAD

"Afghanistan may be liberated from Soviet invasion but will be immediately invaded by aid agencies. The country is ruined and we are aware that without help from outside we will never be able to rebuild our homes, villages and the economic infrastructure but this could also lead to a long-term dependency and it will probably take us a longer time to liberate ourselves from aid than it took us in the liberation war."

This was stated by a commander in Maroof district during a Shura meeting in Obatu, expressing his disappointment over the lack of cooperation and coordination within the forigen aid community.
In Maroof, for example, there are currently three organisations working and at least two more agencies have visited the area recently to search for possibilities of implementing agricultural projects. Many of the organisations do not see the necessity to contact other Pakistan based agencies to check whether someone else is already involved in the area or not. Even when they send their staff in the areas and they meet other agencies working already in the same place and with the same kind of projects and activities, instead of going to areas where no other agency is involved, it happens sometimes that new organisations set up their operations in the same areas and duplicate the work.

For instance in one village three agencies were doing the same work with three different approaches. One agency is working through the Shuras, the second one through the commanders and the third agency through their own staff. In a village all three agencies are involved in cleaning Karezes. Agency one negotiates with the Shuras and pays half of the cost of the repair where the community accepts to pay for the rest or at least contribute towards the project through physical work. Agency two negotiates with the Malik or responsible chief of the village, pays him some money and makes him responsible for the work. Agency three has a fixed amount of money per Karez and asks the villagers to complete the work with that fixed amount.

In another example agency one is distributing seed and fertilizer free of charge through their respective Shuras to the needy farmers plus some basic tools and equipment to help the farmers to stay on their own feet. Agency two brings in seed and fertilizer and sells them at subsidised prices to the farmers.
This brings a lot of confusion among the local people about the

aid agencies and in all three Shura meetings in Salisoon, Obatu and Maroof the members put very strong proposals for the coordination of the different agencies and meant that if the agencies show that they are unable to coordinate, "We see no other possibility than to take our own initiatives and decide how to deal with the agencies." This was in fact the most discouraging and disappointing part of our trip and we felt somehow ashamed vis a vis the local people.

This paper does not intend to make any judgment of which method and approach is good or bad, it also does not intend to justify or claim which agency and whose projects and activities are less or more good, it simply tries to bring up ideas and suggestions to avoid such confusion in future.

In order to go into some detail about the impact of aid in Afghanistan during the war and after the war for the reconstruction of the country, it seems necessary to give a bit of background about the international aid agencies and their impact.

As mentioned briefly in the Introduction, there have always been intentions and quite a few attempts to coordinate the work of the NGOs working either for refugees in Pakistan or those involved in cross border operations. The Coordination of Medical Committees (CMC), Voluntary Organisations Group of Peshawar (VAG), Coordination Committee for Rural Assistance (CCORA) and finaly ACBAR in Peshawar and SWABAC in Quetta are the best examples of such attempts.

People participate with enthusiasm in the meetings from ACBAR to VAG and then to CMC and then to CCORA and so on. I know some colleagues in fact spend most of their time in the meetings and do their office work at night. It is all proof of good will and desire to cooperate and coordinate but, sad as the reality is, there is not much happening in the practically. I assume the following may be the reason for the failure:

1. Most of the meetings, especially the important ones, are attended either by the Directors or at least the other top people of the organisation. Most of the information will not be communicated with the lower levels in the organisation. I have personally run into expatriates working in Volags who did not know what was going on in a certain ACBAR Sub-Committee meeting.

2. Every agency employs a number of highly qualified Afghan staff. Yet the meetings are attended mostly by expatriates, some of whom have never been to Afghanistan and/or who recently arrived in Peshawar and even do not know much about what is going on in the refugee busines. This causes exclusion of their Afghan staff from meetings in which often

the future of Afghanistan is discussed but without the participation of the Afghans themselves.
Even though some organisations and expats do bring or send their Afghan members to these meetings, they (Afghans) are unable to express their wishes, ideas and suggestions. Often noone listen to them (except in a few cases where the Afghan specialists have their main role such as in the Agricultural Sub-Committee).

As soon as they open their mouths they are so demoralised by some people that even when coming to the meetings they prefer not to speak and just sit and listen to what the Big Experts are going to decide in favour of their country and people, again. Because they are shy, do not have good enough command of the English language to make themselves clear, or they need time to make themselves clear - by the time they are ready to express what they want to say after some minutes of introductory notes and explanations, everyone else is tired and noone listen to them.

I always try to make clear to my expatriate friends the major difference between the Afghan and the expat through a very simple example. If you go shopping in the west, as soon as you enter the shop a sales person runs towards you often with a very friendly smile but a demanding, "Can I help you, Sir?" You either know what you want and do your business as soon as possible or you leave the shop immediately. But we all have gone to the Afghan shops. First a cup of tea and then ten minutes later you are asked again how you are and how is the health of your family and so on, and maybe after 20-30 minutes you get into business with him. So you take your time but you always get what you want.

Yes, <u>TIME</u>, this is a major problem of all of us "Experts". We have a totally different attitude towards time than the Afghans have. They do not have the problem of time, they are luckily not yet into the stress of industrialisation and time-pressure. For them their life is passing with the time, it passes with seasons (childhood, youth, old age, ...), they are not concerned about their birth date etc. Always when you ask a rural, even often urban, Afghan how old he is the answer comes, "Fifty years Inshallah, or maybe sixty".

This fact of time besides understanding the Afghans and their mentality is one major problem for all NGOs and other aid agencies. Because Afghans do not understand us and do not want this and that good project or activity. Why should they? Often we try to work for the Afghans but we attempt most of the time to work for ourselves. We seldom go to the Afghans and ask what they want for projects, we decide what will be good for the Afghans. They are our projects and our projections into the Afghan mentality and society.

Not only the organisation and coordination and finally the leadership of all coordination committees are in the hands of expatriates but so also are the lower levels. For example, when the ACBAR Sub-Committees were established, except for one case in no other was there was the idea of choosing or suggesting an Afghan for the Chairmanship of the Sub-Committees. Even in the meetings of the Sub-Committees there are 80-90% foreigners who discuss and decide the future of the Afghans and Afghanistan.

Most of the Afghan staff in the aid agencies are unaware of the decisions of the coordination meetings; even in the organisations where people are open and try at least to circulate the minutes of the meetings, most of their Afghan staff are unable to read or understand the content of the minutes.

Most of us are bound to our head offices abroad or to our donors, we always have to achieve our targets and those targets are set not by our field staff and not at all by the Afghans, making it difficult to be flexible for changes in given situations.

Therefore it is important that the aid agencies first revise their policies and methods of work according to the Afghan reality. Afghanistan cannot be compared with Africa, Latin America or Asia, not even with its close neigbours Pakistan and Iran, especially after ten years of war. Plans and programmes should be designed according to possibilities and the given situation in Afghanistan and this can be only done if Afghans are consulted, specially those who have been working for their own people during the harsh time of war either inside or in the refugee camps in the past ten years.

Afghan specialists from abroad should be more encouraged to come and take active part in the planning process of the reconstruction. Expatriates, especially those who have started to work with Afghans recently, should rather stay as technical and managerial advisers. If we are to help the Afghans then we should help them to help themselves. We can do this only by involving Afghans in all steps of the rebuilding of their country and let them decide what kind of programmes they want and how they want to rebuild their country. Because they are the people who will live there and not us.

We should also be careful about our approaches regarding the amount of work and the level we can carry out. Our organisations might be well enough equipped to carry out any kind of program but the war torn country and its society is not ready and prepared for any ambitious and modernised program. We all have to consider this carefully and consult the Afghans, especially those inside Afghanistan, before we make any further plans.

It was then decided that the Director of ARC should undertake trips to evaluate the present activities of the organisation in the said three Provinces and present a detailed report to its donors, including a more specific plan for the next years to come. It was also agreed that ARC would conduct a detailed survey on the socio-economic situation in the country as soon as possible to find out areas of need and priorities of its population in those areas. An expatriate was employed in November to prepare and conduct the survey together with an Afghan counterpart and some local assistants.

Coordination of Agencies Working for Afghanistan

After the signing of the Geneva Accords a number of conferences and meetings took place in Pakistan as well as abroad to discuss the possible return of the refugees and the repatriation of the displaced people within the country.

Among others the Voluntary Agencies (Volags) working for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and those who were involved in various projects inside Afghanistan during the war decided to put themselves together in a coordination committee, Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) to exchange experiences and information and to coordinate the possible expansion of activities in Afghanistan in the near and/or far future.


The initial bases for ACBAR were the existing coordinations from previous years, i.e. Coordination of Medical Committees (CMC), Voluntary Agencies Group of Peshawar (VAG) and the Cooperative Committee for Rural Assistance (CCORA). CMC came into life in 1986 to coordinate the medical work inside Afghanistan and consisted of about 12 organisations. VAG was created in 1987 to coordinate the work among the Afghan refugees in Peshawar and consisted of 11 organisations, some of whom were only involved in refugee progrmmes and some in refugee assistance as well as inside Afghanistan, but the common issue between them was that they all were implementing projects for refugees which were partly funded by UNHCR. Finally, CCORA was created also in late 1987 to coordinate the rural assistance projects implemented at that time by a dozen Volags who were mainly involved in cash for food, agriculture, irrigation and a few other small activities.


A Joint Council was created between these three organisations, concerned UN agencies and US AID shortly after the signing of the Geneva Accords, which led then to the formation of ACBAR.

ARC has been a permanent member of VAG and CCORA right from the beginning and was involved in the creation of both coordinations, with other agencies. ARC has also kept in close touch with CMC, through its Medical Supervisor.


Karez _ Plan

Main Well





Section A _ A Karez



APPENDIX 5

Role of Foreign Aid Agencies

The presence of more and more foreign aid agencies and the development of ACBAR and other coordinations are causing considerable concern to ARC. Because we feel this is such an important issue, Nassim Jawad's Paper on this is attached to this Report as Appendix 4.

ARC'S WORK IN AFGHANISTAN : BACKGROUND

Kunar

In 1984/85 a French team assigned by Bureau International Afghanistan (BIA) and headed by Alain de Bures was working in Kunar on improvement of agriculture and animal husbandry. After their return to Peshawar they reported that the grain production had seriously decreased in the Province and the farmers were currently harvesting only 50% of the amount they were producing before the war. Among other reasons for the vast decrease in production and harvest were mentioned a lack of selected seed and fertilizer. As a result of their survey and report ARC together with BIA, the Swedish Committee and OXFAM decided to undertake a project to distribute selected maize and wheat seed to the farmers. The coordination between these agencies continued up to 1987 when BIA took over sole responsibility and further expansion of their activities.

Kandahar

In autumn 1985 villages around Kandahar city and Arghandab, Kandahar were severely bombed by the Soviets and the Kabul regime, killing a number of people and injuring many more and forcing about 500 families to leave their villages with just the clothes they were wearing and move towards Baluchistan in Pakistan to seek refuge. The commanders of the Province and particularly of areas such as Shah Wali Kot asked the people to resettle in other safer areas and tried to stop them becoming refugees in Pakistan.

In order to be able to keep those people inside the country, some commanders came to Peshawar to seek support for those families from the aid agencies. ARC finally agreed to support the families with food, shelter and bedding for the next few months, with the condition that they should also be receiving assistance to cultivate the agricultural fields available in the area and become self-sufficient for the next years to come. By the time ARC arrived in Kandahar 200 families had already moved to Baluchistan but the remaining 300 families agreed to work on the fields with the agreement of the local population and the support of the commanders. Beside food rations for the next six months,

tents, bedding and household utensils, wheat seed and fertilizer and some basic agricultural tools were provided to all families, who started to work on the land immediately.

The positive response of those families and the good harvest in the next early summer 1986 motivated not only commanders of other parts of Kandahar but also of other Provinces to come to Peshawar and negotiate agricultural projects. Applications for agricultural projects poured into ARC as well as to other organisations from early 1986 onwards.

Logar

At the end of 1986 a team of field officers from ARC went to Logar Province to conduct a survey of the agricultural situation in Charkh District. A pilot project was implemented in early 1987 and has been expanded now to two other districts too.

Ghazni

Finally, a pilot project was started in Jaghori in Ghazni Province in early 1988 and expanded in the autumn, through one of ARC's farmer members who decided to go to his homeland in 1986 and do some work there.

IMPLEMENTING PROCEDURE

The implementation of the agricultural assistance to the 300 families in Shorawak of Kandahar was initially negotiated and then also implemented through the local commanders, who at that time were the only representatives of the population outside the country. In 1986 ARC expanded its activities in Kandahar through the local commanders and became involved in various districts and parts of Kandahar for the next year, i.e. Arghandab, Dand, Maroof, and Arghastan. The initial aim of this expansion was to enable a large number of farmers all over Kandahar Province to increase their agricultural production as much as possible and enable the population to stay in their home villages and prevent the growing influx of refugees into Pakistan.

Selected wheat and maize seed, vegetable seed, fertilizer, water pumps, agricultural tools and equipment, spray pumps and chemicals for orchards and vineyards and finally ploughing oxen were distributed through the local commanders to the said districts.

An internal evaluation by ARC's field officers and an external evaluation by Nick Gardner of OXFAM in 1986/87 indicated that the assistance had not been distributed appropriately and effectively: the commanders had been distributing the goods to people they favoured and to their relatives and friends and,

especially, had not taken into consideration the poorest farmers, neglecting the prior aim of ARC's projects.

The project became too large at once and spread in different parts of the Province so that the field officers were unable to take care of the transportation of the goods, which were mainly purchased in Pakistan, and so they had to rely on the commanders for the transfer and part of the distribution of the goods to ensure a quick and on-time distribution of the inputs. As a result some of the oxen did not arrive at the places where they were supposed to, some of the water pumps were lying in Baluchistan for months waiting for commanders to have the time and possibility to transport them to the areas, and some of the needy farmers were left out of attention.

In 1987 negotiations took place between the commanders and ARC staff in Quetta, Baluchistan as well as inside Kandahar to resolve those problems continuously faced in 1986. Finally our proposal to work through local Shuras in which the commanders, representatives of the villages and peasants should participate was accepted. (A detailed description of the Shura is attached as Appendix 2.) Also it was decided that ARC should concentrate on one or maximum two districts starting with a few villages and slowly expanding its activity village by village and finally district by district. Finally it was decided that the work should be based on a rural development basis and through the assistance the villagers in the long term should be helped to help themselves, a strategy which ARC has been following for its refugee programmes since the beginning of its activities in 1980.

In the Shuras which ARC's field officers created at both village and district levels the representatives consist of military commanders, mullahs, land owners and farmers, i.e. those who are respected for their position, experience, education and/or wealth. Projects, budgets, needs and activities are discussed and decided with the Shura members before launching activities, and reports and achievements are not only discussed but also approved by the shuras so that the shuras are accountable not only to the population of their own area but also to ARC.

The idea behind this system is to let the farmers and the people come up with ideas, suggestions and finally with projects, meaning that we are not going to them and telling them what we want to do for them but we are asking them about their needs and priorities and considering these needs as top priorities.

The role of the field officers is mainly to work out the ideas into projects, to provide and distribute the inputs in coordination with the shuras and to give the recipients technical know-how and input.

PROCESS OF A PROJECT

1. Field officers, who are trained agriculturists, are sent to a district to do a preliminary survey on the socio-economic condition, with more emphasis on agriculture and animal husbandry. We try our utmost to ensure that the field officers (in many cases two) come from the same district and have contacts with the Mujahedin commanders there, who can support their work and provide them with security during travel and during their stay in the area. However, in many cases it happens that the commanders make a request for a project and we look for personnel who belong to the same area.

2. The first task of the field officers is to create a local shura in cooperation with the local commander, who has agreed upon the shura already in Peshawar before the field officers depart. They explain the purpose of their visit, the aims of ARC, its activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan and request them to help them in doing their survey.

3. The preliminary survey is designed to elicit information such as size of population, skills, number of farmers, total size of arable land, average size of land owned per farmer, types of crops, size of crops on average, irrigation system, traction, animal husbandry, livestock, infrastructure, access, availability of agricultural inputs and others. The information always includes the condition before the war and presently, to have a comparison of the situation. The information is collected from all levels of the community and not only from the shura members; shura meetings are often open to the public too.

4. After the survey, which takes one to two months according to the size of the area, a pilot project will be started with the agreement of the shura members including the most needy farmers of the area. A pilot project mainly consists of selected seed, fertilizer, basic agricultural tools and equipment, agricultural chemicals, spray pumps, etc. (It is worth mentioning that not all the information which is collected during the preliminary survey is accurate, because people are not aware of the outcome of the survey and what will really happen afterwards. Often they believe this might be some kind of data collection for other purposes such as taxation. All the data is therefore updated after the implementation of the pilot project, when the farmers are confident that nothing will go wrong for them.)

5. After the successful implementation of the pilot phase a detailed project proposal is worked out by the field officers in cooperation with the shura members. A typical project for an area is designed for one year, i.e. provision

of wheat seed for autumn cultivation plus fertilizer; evaluation of the harvest from the autumn distribution and distribution of maize seed and fertilizer for summer cultivation in spring; and survey of a new area to be covered in next autumn. During the time before and after the distribution and between the harvests the field officers give technical advice on the use of seed and fertilizer, saving seed for the next year's cultivation; look into the problems with the land such as weeds and so on; spray the orchards and vineyards; and look into other problems, e.g. animal husbandry and livestock. In the regular shura meetings ideas and needs of the population are collected for the expansion of the project as well as for other activities which might be needed.

6. At a <u>later stage</u> vaccinators and veterinarians are trained and employed from within the same community who will remain in the area and continue their work after the field officers have left the area. In addition one to two local assistants are employed among the local population with some educational background, trained by the field officers and left in the area after the completion of the project to further assist the farmers and continue monitoring of the activities. Problems are then discussed with the field officers who go back to the same area from time to time to monitor the continuation of their activities.

7. A second step of the activities is the repair and improvement and further development of the <u>irrigation systems</u>. Karezes(1) are repaired, embankments are constructed to prevent agricultural land from the spring floods, small dams are made to reserve water in the rivers for agricultural use, and small access roads and bridges are repaired during the year.

8. Since the majority of the young men and many farmers are still involved in the war, besides those who have been killed, imprisoned or disabled, <u>traction</u> is another problem

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A karez is an underground canal with a number of wells every 20-50 metres. The deepest well starts at the top of the valley/ hill far from the village (up to 50 meters deep) going downwards to the village (lower wells are 3-4 metres deep). The water is then collected in a water reservoir close to the village from which it is then distributed through streams and canals to fields. It is also used for drinking purpose and home use. The longest Karez we saw in Kharwar was about 7 km. with over 40 wells and it took us almost two hours to walk up to the last or first well on the top of the hill. See Diagram (Appendix 5).

which is discussed and in some cases ploughing oxen are provided to those who cannot afford them themselves. We had a bad experience of providing oxen to the farmers through the local commanders in 1986 and therefore we have not gone into a large oxen project yet. Nevertheless it is considered to be one of the major problems, especially among poor farmers, and will be taken into consideration in future projects.

9. The ten years of war have left approximately one million dead and probably several hundred thousand disabled, meaning that tens of thousands of families have lost their bread-winners and cannot survive without some assistance from outside. Previously the social structure always provided security for such people through the community but since the entire community in the rural areas have lost so much during the war, they can no longer afford to help their fellow-villagers who are in trouble. Therefore a special project was designed to <u>help those needy families</u> with a start-up capital as a single phase assistance to help them to become self-reliant. On average 50 such families in every project area are surveyed annually with suggestions of what they would be able to do or how they could work with a certain amount of money in order to be self-sufficient in the future. In many cases a cow or ten goats or sheep are provided to them with explanation how to keep and maintain the animals to help them in the long term. In a few cases sewing machines, cloth material, shops to sell basic supplies and other assistance have been provided.

10. In 1988 the field officers started to go into the possibilities of <u>assisting the skilled people</u> living in the villages. A few cases have been considered and assistance provided to them in the form of tools and equipment.

11. <u>Finally</u>, once a district is covered totally with the basic needs and most poor farmers have received assistance and the major problem areas are covered, the team of field officers move to the next district, leaving the local assistants and the veterinarians behind in the villages.

A typical project in one area covers around 500 to 700 farmers per year with an estimated cost of approximately Pak.Rs.3 million.

Currently ARC operates in three Provinces: Kandahar, Ghazni and Logar. In Kandahar, Maroof District will have been covered by a typical project as described above by the end of 1989 and work has already started in Arghastan district in autumn 1988, where approximately 250 farmers have been surveyed to be part of the spring campaign in 1989. In Logar, Charkh district has been almost covered and the team has conducted surveys in Baraki

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REPORT OF FIELD TRIPS

LOGAR AND KANDAHAR PROVINCES, AFGHANISTAN

October/November 1988

NASSIM JAWAD / GUNNAR ANDERSEN

AUSTRIAN RELIEF COMMITTEE FOR AFGHAN REFUGEES